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INTRODUCTION
In the past 25 years or so, the issue of ethical universalizability has 
figured prominently in theoretical as well as practical ethics. The term, 
‘universalizability’ used in connection with ethical considerations, was 
apparently first introduced in the mid-1950s by R. M. Hare to refer to 
what he characterized as a logical thesis about certain sorts of evalu-
ative sentences (Hare, 1955). The term has since been used to cover a 
broad variety of ethical considerations including those associated with 
the ideas of impartiality, consistency, justice, equality, and reversibil-
ity as well as those raised in the familar questions: ‘What if everyone 
did that?’ and ‘How would you like it if someone did that to you?’
But this recent effloresence of the use of the term ‘universalizability’ 
is something that has deep historical roots, and has been central in 
various forms to the thinking about morality of some of the greatest 
and most influential philosophers in the western tradition. While the 
term is relatively new, the ideas it is now used to express have a long 
history. Most of these ideas and questions have been or can be formu-
lated into a principle to be discussed, criticized, or defended. As we 
discuss these ideas below this principle will be stated on a separate 
numbered line.
The concepts of justice and equality were closely linked in Greek 
thought. These connections between these two concepts are apparent 
even in two authors who were hostile to the connection, Plato and Ar-
istotle. They at tempted to defuse the connection by emphasizing that 
justice or equality requires treating unequals unequally (see Vlastos, 
1973). Aristotle writes:
Now if the unjust is unequal, the just must be equal; and that is, in fact, 
what everyone believes without argument ... the just involves at least 
four terms: there are two persons in whose eyes it is just, and the shares 
which are just are two. Also, there will be the same equality between 
the persons and the shares; the ratio between the shares will be the 
same as that between the persons. If the persons are not equal, their 
[just I shares will not be equal; but this is the source of quarrels and 
recriminations, when equals have and are awarded unequal shares or 
unequals equal shares.1
This discussion could be condensed into the following principle.
(1) Treat equals equally, unequals unequally.
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Jesus in the New Testament gives an influential statement of what has 
long been called the “Golden Rule,” but which is more often discussed 
by philosophers under the title of a moral principle of reversibility:
(2) Do unto others as you would have others do unto you.
There seem to be problems with the Golden Rule when we attempt 
to use it to determine what our obligations in specific circumstances 
are. It is because of these difficulties that, as is remarked below, philos-
ophers, when they get their hands on this principle tend to turn it into 
a non-substantive principle (see Singer, 1963; Gewirth, 1978). Another 
course is followed by Narveson in the lead essay of this anthology, 
who considers its claims as a moral principle in a variety of different 
formulations and rejects them all. Apart from such specific difficulties, 
part of the basic insight of the Golden Rule remains alive in those phi-
losophers such as Kurt Baier who make significant use of such related 
notions as reversibility or reciprocity.
One of the most influential of moral philosophers ever, Immanuel 
Kant, proposed several different formulations of what he called “the 
categorical imperative.” And he called the categorical imperative the 
“supreme principle of morality.” This latter phrase apparently means 
that he believed that this principle was the only moral principle needed 
to determine our moral obligations in any particular circumstance (i.e., 
with reference to any given maxim). Other statements used in arriving 
at such conclusions about our moral obligations would be one and all 
non-moral statements. According to this view, any other correct moral 
principles or rules, such as “Don’t tell lies,” or “Be beneficent,” would 
be a subsidiary principle or rule arrived at using only a single moral 
principle, the categorical imperative itself. What is often called the 
“first formulation” of the categorical imperative is a version of what 
we will shortly be referring to as a substantive universalizability prin-
ciple. Here are two different statements of it:
(3) Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same 
 time will that it should become a universal law.
(4) Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through 
 your will a universal law of nature (Kant, 1785, AK., IV, 421).
The differences between these two versions are important for its ap-
plication, but for our present purposes we may refer to either state-
ment indifferently as versions of what we will call, following the usual 
introduction xi
practice, the “first formulation” of the categorical imperative. Both 
versions contain the key phrase “universal law” which makes it clear 
that Kant’s attempt is to use a substantive universalizability principle 
as the basis of his entire moral theory. This is the most ambitious claim 
ever made for a principle of ethical universalizability.
Henry Sidgwick, writing about a century ago, kept a notion of univer-
salizability alive within the utilitarian tradition:
(5) [I]f a kind of conduct that is right (or wrong) for me is not 
 right (or wrong) for someone else, it must be on the ground of 
 some difference between the two cases, other than the fact 
 that I and he are different persons (Sidgwick, 1901, p. 379).
Another formulation which seems likely to yield quite similar re-
sults to Sidgwick’s principle is one that has been mentioned by more 
than one recent writer; here it is given in a formulation from a recent 
book by an author who is a contributor to the present volume, Wlodz-
imierz Rabinowicz:
(6)  Moral properties of things (persons, actions, states of affairs, 
 situations) are essentially independent of their purely ‘indi-
 vidual’ or ‘numerical’ aspects (Rabinowicz, 1979, p. 11).
Another direction has been taken by another much discussed writer 
who also contributes to this volume, Marcus Singer:
(7) If the consequences of everyone’s doing some action x would be 
 undesirable, then no one ought to do x (Singer, 1961, p. 66).
In another recent influential essay Bernard Williams imagines a 
world in which we have the power to control, alter, and improve all of 
people’s personal qualities to the point where each is brought up to the 
level of all the others in qualifications. He writes,
In these circumstances, where everything about a person is control-
lable, equality of opportunity and absolute equality seem to coincide; 
and this itself illustrates something about the notion of equality of op-
portunity (Williams, 1962, pp. 128-9).
The idea of absolute equality appears to be one of the more radical 
theses that a concept of universalizability could yield: the idea that all 
persons should be treated in exactly the same way period.2 Such an 
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idea has had few if any defenders, but as the present quotation from 
Williams indicates, its existence as a possible ideal may be used to help 
clarify by contrast other related conceptions. Williams’ thought may 
be formulated in the following principle:
(8) Where all differences between persons are controllable, equal-
 ity of opportunity and absolute equality coincide.
The connections with universalizability are also clear in the state-
ment of the first part of John Rawls’ principle of justice:
(9) [E]ach person is to have an equal right to the most extensive 
 basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others 
 (Rawls, 1971, p. 60).
The connections with universalizability are to be found in the words 
“equal” and “similar.”
The above nine principles aim to represent both the history and the 
possible scope of concepts of ethical universalizability. There are some 
who think that it is not a single concept that has such a scope, but 
at best a family of concepts that exhibit family resemblance, and at 
worst a miscellaneous assortment of ideas arising from various puns 
on key words such as “equal” and “universal.” And we wish to regard 
these questions about the unity of the concept of universalizability and 
about the importance or soundness of the concept in its applications 
(the Nakhnikian issue) as open ones. 
Singer, though not exactly a “sceptic” in either of the senses just 
specified, remarks in his paper below that not only has ‘universaliz-
ability’ been used to cover a variety of distinct theses, but ’... the ... 
term has been so promiscuously generalized as to cover a variety of 
only tenuously related matters.’ 
These points raise questions about the connections, however tenu-
ous, among these principles, which in turn raise more fundamental 
questions about their meaning, justification, and application. The pa-
pers contained in this anthology represent some of the most recent 
thinking about these fundamental questions regarding universaliz-
ability principles and related matters. In editing this volume, we have 
sought to arrange the papers ac cording to what seems to us as a help-
ful way of distinguishing among types of universalizability principles. 
In what follows, we shall introduce our scheme of organization and 
explain how the papers fit into this scheme.
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We have found it convenient to classify universalizability principles 
of the sort listed above according to whether they are non-substantive 
or substantive. What we mean in calling a principle ‘non-substantive’ 
is, roughly, that such a principle does not entail, either alone or to-
gether with other non-moral premises, any moral conclusions of the 
sort that something (some action, person, state of affairs) has a certain 
moral property. Rather, it is only in connection with a moral Judgment 
or statement to the effect that a thing of a certain sort has a certain 
moral property that a non-substantive principle can be used to derive 
any moral conclusions. By contrast, a ‘substantive’ ethical principle is 
one which, either alone or together with other non-moral premises, 
can be used to derive moral conclusions.
This distinction between non-substantive and substantive moral 
principles is the basis for what seems to be a main division between 
two types of universalizability principles. Thus, the so-called ‘princi-
ple of universalizability,’ alternatively expressed by the first two prin-
ciples on the above list, is typically interpreted as a principle of ethical 
consistency, which as one author has put it: ‘may be seen as a purely 
hypothetical thesis. According to it, a certain moral claim applies to an 
object only if similar moral claims apply to similar moral objects’ (Rabi-
nowicz, 1979, p. 14). The idea is that in order to derive a moral claim 
about (for example) the moral quality of some action in a certain situ-
ation, this principle must be taken in conjunction with a moral claim 
about the possession of the same moral quality by a similar action in a 
similar situation. By contrast, substantive universalizability principles, 
such as Kant’s categorical imperative and Marcus Singer’s generaliza-
tion argument, are not hypothetical in this sense; rather they set forth 
a standard or test for determining in connection with other non-moral 
information, the moral acceptability of something. In the case of the 
categorical imperative, those actions whose maxims cannot be willed 
consistently as universal laws of nature are unacceptable. The general-
ization argument on the other hand (If the consequences of everyone’s 
doing some action x would be undesirable then no one ought to do x 
without a reason) sets forth a standard forbidding those actions the 
general doing of which would produce undesirable consequences.
Reflection on important differences between the principles of Kant 
and Singer in particular, and on the differences between two of the 
main normative ethical traditions in general, viz., the Kantian and 
utilitarian traditions, suggests a further subdivision within the class 
of substantive universalizability principles. Thus, if we use the term, 
‘consequentialist’, in a general way to denote not only utilitarian prin-
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ciples, but also those associated, though strictly speaking non-utilitar-
ian, principles,3 then we can distinguish between Kantian and conse-
quentialist universalizability principles.
Of course, this scheme for dividing universalizability principles is 
only intended to provide a rough means for classifying such princi-
ples, one which though useful, does not seem to make mutually exclu-
sive divisions. For example, Jonathan Harrison, in his contribution to 
this volume, seems to be proposing a consequentialist moral theory, 
though one incorporating considerations of Kantian universalizabil-
ity. Moreover, some principles are not clearly classifiable as either sub-
stantive or non-substantive, e.g., the Golden Rule. In its most common 
formulation ‘Do unto others as you would have them do unto you,’ 
it appears to set forth a test or criterion for morally acceptable action. 
Gewirth has put it this way. ‘This criterion consists in the agent’s de-
sires or wishes for himself qua recipient: what determines the moral 
rightness of a transaction initiated or controlled by some person is 
whether he would himself want to undergo such a transaction at the 
hands of another’ (Gewirth, 1978, p. 133). 
Now the problems with the Golden Rule so interpreted have been 
recorded many times, going back at least as far as Kant (see Kant, 1785, 
AK, IV, 430n). In attempting to preserve the spirit of this principle, if 
not the letter, many philosophers have sought to find an acceptable 
formulation of the rule. And what is interesting is that some, though 
not all, of these attempts have in effect transformed it from an appar-
ently substantive principle into a non-substantive principle (see Sing-
er, 1963, and Blackstone, 1965).
With these points in mind, let us turn to some of the specific issues 
that have been raised in connection with each of these types of uni-
versalizability principles and briefly indicate how the papers in this 
collection are related to such issues as well as to each other.
ETHICAL UNIVERSALIZABILITY: A VARIETY OF THESES
We placed Jan Narveson’s paper at the head of the anthology be-
cause it provides a broad survey of some of the main theses that have 
been discussed or might be discussed under the title of ‘universaliz-
ability.’ This survey to some extent cuts across the distinctions embod-
ied in the arrangement of the rest of the essays in the present volume, 
so that there is scarcely another single appropriate place for it in our 
table of contents. It also provides an excellent introduction to the pres-
ent state of discussions of universalizability. The range of Narveson’s 
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discussion is great, emphasizing a point we have already made in this 
introduction, that the term ‘universalizability’ is today used to cover 
quite a large family of ideas. Some of these theses when they are con-
sidered as the only contribution that the concept of universalizability 
has to make to morality, make the contribution of that concept rather 
peripheral. Others, when considered by themselves, make universaliz-
ability to be close to the essence of morality. After taking us on a tour 
of some of the more peripheral conceptions, Narveson zeroes in on 
some of the more important conceptions, the ones in which he finds 
himself the most interested.
In the course of his discussion he criticizes certain formulations of 
the Golden Rule and other reversibility criteria as causing problems 
seemingly no matter how they are formulated. He does not distinguish 
sharply between U-for mulations that are utilitarian or consequential-
ist and those that are not. In fact it is an interesting surprise to find this 
well-known defender and explicator of utilitarianism to be indicating 
some doubts about certain aspects of utilitarianism (see especially note 
31) and to be defending the view that universalizability is close to the 
essence of morality. His final formulation is:
U16 R is an acceptable moral rule only if there is suffi-
  cient reason in terms of their own values, for all 
  moral agents who have reason to decline the 
  ruleless state to accept R.
The qualification referring to those who “have reason to decline the 
ruleness state,” would omit or exclude only those who prefer or at 
least have no reason on balance to reject the Hobbesian state of nature. 
Fortunately such a person would be both rare and unusual. Apart from 
this exclusion, which we have every reason to expect is insignificant, 
the point is that there are certain rules which everyone will have an 
interest in everyone’s following. Such a skeleton of rules for social rela-
tions, if they are fairly well in place, can give us assurance in dealing 
with others. Many of these rules, as we may expect, would be negative 
rules of non-interference. And since U16 refers to “all moral agents,” 
it puts aside golden rule issues about whether agent or patient prefer-
ence should be followed.
U16 is then finally a principle that is not merely proposed abstractly 
for our decision-making; it is instead based on a conception of what 
morality is for (regulating the skeleton of all personal relations so that 
individuals can within this structure accomplish their own goals). And 
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it places one specific concept of universalizability at quite a central 
location in the structure of morality.
UNIVERSALIZABILITY AND ETHICAL CONSISTENCY
If an action is right (or wrong) for one agent in a certain circumstance, 
then it is right (or wrong) for any similar agent in similar circum-
stances.
This is one formulation of a non-substantive principle of ethical 
universalizability that has been given various labels: the Principle of 
Universalizability; the Generalization Principle; the Principle of Jus-
tice; the Principle of Impartiality; to mention the most common. In one 
variant formulation or another, this principle enjoys widespread ac-
ceptance among moral philosophers despite the fact that there is not 
widespread agreement about its meaning (and hence correct formula-
tion); or about its justification (or how it should be “accounted for”); 
or about its implications, not only in connection with practical moral 
issues (i.e., concerning its practical application) but also in connection 
with other moral principles. These and associated issues are taken up 
in the papers by Singer, Rabinowicz, Nielsen, Olafson, Gorr, and Lycan 
and are thus grouped together in the anthology. In order to indicate 
how these authors approach these issues, it will be useful to provide 
brief sketches of their articles (though we have refrained from engag-
ing in detailed exegesis and criticism).
The paper by Marcus Singer, ‘Universalizability and the Generaliza-
tion Principle,’ touches on a number of the above-mentioned issues 
concerning this principle of ethical consistency. In particular, Singer 
considers its justification and various criticisms that have been leveled 
against it. The paper is divided into five sections. In Sections I and II, 
Singer considers certain important theses advanced by R. M. Hare con-
cerning the principle’s interpretation and justification. Hare prefers 
the label ‘Principle of Universalizability’ for the principle in question, 
and has argued on a number of occasions that, owing to important dif-
ferences in meaning between ‘universal’ and ‘general,’ it is incorrect 
and misleading to speak of ethical generalization, or to use the label 
‘The Generalization Principle’ (Singer’s label) either for the principle 
in ques tion or for associated ideas in ethics. In the first section of this 
paper Singer examines Hare’s arguments for this claim and, finding 
them inconclusive, defends his use of ‘generalization’ for the idea and 
principle in question.
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Hare has also advanced an account or explanation of the truth or 
validity of the principle of universalizability. According to Hare, Sin-
gular moral judgments (e.g., ‘It is right (wrong, obligatory) for me to 
tell the truth in these circumstances’) are universalizable in the sense 
that they commit the person making the judgment to a corresponding 
universal judgment (‘It is (right, wrong, obligatory) for anyone who is 
relevantly similar to me in relevantly similar circumstances to tell the 
truth’). The entailment relation between singular and universal moral 
judgments holds because the principle of universalizability holds and 
the truth or validity of this principle is to be explained by reference to 
descriptive meaning rules that govern (at least in part) the meaning 
of such singular judgments. The central idea is this. On Hare’s view, 
singular moral judgments in which such evaluative terms as ‘right,’ 
‘wrong’, and ‘obligatory’ occur as predicates are analogous to ordi-
nary singular descriptive judgments in which descriptive terms occur 
as predicates (e.g., “This is red”). The meanings of such predicates 
(both evaluative and descriptive) are governed by descriptive mean-
ing rules-rules which, so Hare explains, “lay it down that we may ap-
ply an expression to objects which are similar to each other in certain 
respects.” He adds, “It is a direct consequence of this that we cannot 
without consistency apply a descriptive term to one thing, and refuse 
to apply it to another similar thing (either exactly similar or similar 
in the relevant respects)” (Hare, 1963, p. 13). So, on Hare’s view, the 
universalizability of moral judgments (or the principle of ethical uni-
versalizability) is to be explained or justified in a way analogous to the 
way the universalizability of singular descriptive judgments is to be 
explained, viz. by appealing to descriptive meaning rules.
In Section II, Singer criticizes this account of the principle of uni-
versalizability, charging that it leads not only to triviality but “leads 
[Hare] to move from his theoretical account of its basis—in descriptive 
meaning rules—to otherwise sensible judgments inconsistent with the 
original account.”
In Section III, then, Singer turns to ills own account of the validity 
of this principle, reaffirming the view he offered in his Generalization 
in Ethics, according to which it is the inferential character of singular 
moral judgments—a feature that makes them analogous to “because” 
judgments in general and to causal and probability judgments in par-
ticular—that accounts for the validity of the generalization principle.
Turning to Sections IV and V, Singer (Section IV) considers the use 
Alan Gewirth has made of the generalization principle in the context 
of his own moral theory. Gewirth attempts to deduce what he claims 
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to be the supreme principle of morality—the so-called principle of ge-
neric consistency—in an argument one of whose premises is the gen-
eralization principle. Singer considers Gewirth’s use of the principle 
and critically discusses some of the claims Gewirth has made about 
the generalization principle, in particular that it is neither a substantial 
nor a moral principle and that it “set no limits on the criteria of rele-
vant similarity or the sufficient reasons for having the right to perform 
various actions” (Gewirth, 1978, p. 106). Singer argues in the first place 
that, when properly understood, this principle is both substantial and 
moral (as well as being logical) and furthermore, that “when properly 
understood [it] illuminates the concept of a genuine moral reason and 
what can count as one and what cannot, and shows that it is not open 
to anyone to invoke its form in justification of what is unjustified.” 
Section V again takes up and considers further the criticism that the 
generalization principle sets no limits on what can count as a genuine 
moral reason.
The above formulation of a universalizability principle with which 
we began our discussion of the papers in this section makes reference 
to the notion of similarity. In fact, this notion which is absolutely cru-
cial in this and related principles, admits of two different interpreta-
tions, one in terms of exact similarity, and the other in terms of relevant 
similarity. Each has special problems. The problem with the exact 
similarity formulation is that together with the Leibnizian thesis that 
indiscernability (exact similarity) entails identity, the principle turns 
out to be trivial. That is, together with Leibniz’s principle, the ethical 
principle of universalizability thus interpreted reduces to: If an action 
is right (or wrong) for one agent, then it is right (or wrong) for that 
agent. On the other hand, the relevant similarities variant of the prin-
ciple encounters the vexing (and, according to some, insurmountable) 
problem that the notion of relevance is unclear. Thus, we have what 
Rabinowicz calls the ‘universalizability dilemma’: embracing either of 
the only two alternative formulations seems unacceptable.
Rabinowicz’s paper, ‘The Universalizability Dilemma,’ offers a way 
out of the dilemma. Making use of set-theoretic models and defining 
the principle of universalizability as a condition on a model, Rabinow-
icz employs, in addition to the concepts of exact similarity (copyhood) 
and relevant similarity, the concept of a universal aspect of a situation. 
Taking this newly introduced concept as primitive, Rabinowicz for-
mulates a universalizability condition on a model that he claims is not 
trivialized by the Leibnizian principle and does not make use of the 
problematic concept of relevant similarity.
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In ‘Universalizability and the Commitment to Impartiality,’ Kai 
Nielsen is concerned with the rationalist program of seeking ‘·the 
foundations of justice and sometimes the whole of morality in an a 
priori or formal principle of Universalizability.” Nielsen denies that this 
program can be carried out and illustrates his claim by considering the 
attempts to go from the principle of universalizability (either directly 
or together with other considerations of logic and rationality) to an 
impartiality principle of the following sort: ‘All human beings have an 
equal right to the fulfillment of their interests.’
Nielsen begins by making the same distinctions we have seen in 
Rabinowicz between the exact and the relevant similarity variants of 
the principle of universalizability. Working with the latter variant, 
Nielsen points out its two important limitations. First, it “does not 
tell us what is right or wrong, good or bad, or what ought or ought not 
be done. It says rather if one thing is right, good or ought to be done, 
then another thing relevantly similar to it is too.” In other words, the 
principle is non-substantive. Second, Nielsen claims that the principle 
itself does not specify or set forth any criteria for determining what 
counts as being relevantly similar from the moral point of view. So, 
in order to go from the principle of universalizability to the principle 
of impartiality, one would have to judge first that some human be-
ing has a right to have his or her interests fulfilled and second that 
all human beings are (in general) relevantly similar. Since such ad-
ditions do not follow directly from the principle in question and do 
not seem to be matters of logic, one can, without being inconsistent 
or irrational, affirm the principle of universalizability yet deny the 
principle of impartiality. (Nielsen reaches the same conclusion as a 
result of analysing Paul Taylor’s claim that from the principle of uni-
versalizability one can derive the following principle of impartiality: 
‘Ifit is wrong for another to discriminate against him (the agent) on 
the ground of a difference he (the agent) does not acknowledge to 
be relevant, it must also be wrong for him (the agent) to discriminate 
against another on the ground of a difference the other does not ac-
cept as relevant.’)
The upshot, at least if Nielsen is correct, is that doubt has been thrown 
on the rationalist strategy of using an apparently formal principle as a 
foundation on which to base substantive moral principles.
The papers by Olafson and Gorr are concerned with this general up-
shot of Nielsen’s paper. Both papers consider the use of universaliz-
ability as a formal foundation (or at least as part of one), on which to 
base substantive moral principles.
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As we have already noted, although Hare and Singer seem to dis-
agree over the correct account or justification of the principle of ethi-
cal consistency, they do agree that this principle admits of a “logical” 
justification—one that makes essential reference to the logic of moral 
terms (see e.g., Singer, 1961, p. 34, and Hare, 1963, p. 30). We have also 
just noted Nielsen’s argument that from such a formal, logically based 
principle, either alone or together with considerations of logic a.nd ra-
tionality, it is not possible to derive any substantive moral principles 
or judgments. In particular he argues that it is not possible to derive a 
principle of impartiality. The paper by Frederick Olafson, ‘Reflections 
on a Passage in Mill’s Utilitarianism,’ offers an account of the principle 
in question that stands in sharp contrast to these views of Hare, Singer, 
and Nielsen.
Beginning with a suggestive passage from Mill’s Utilitarianism, 
Olafson is concerned to defend a certain thesis concerning our al-
legedly rationally based commitment to a principle of impartiality 
(or what Olafson calls ‘intersubjective reciprocity’). According to 
Olafson, “Mill’s argument appears to postulate a direct connection 
between our social natures and a relationship to at least some other 
human beings in which we acknowledge an operative equivalence 
between their situation and our own.” Olafson’s elaboration of this 
argument in Mill goes as follows. We are essentially social creatures 
having a “social nature” involving, among other things, entering into 
agreements (both explicit and implicit) with other human beings. 
Such agreements presuppose “a set of conceptual instruments that 
function in a neutral manner as far as differences between persons 
and their points of view are concerned.” This implies that in cases 
of conflicting interests, we must at least implicitly acknowledge the 
idea that, in general, no one person’s interests occupy a special or 
privileged position. In other words, reflecting on our social natures 
reveals that we implicitly if not explicitly assent to the idea that, gen-
erally, the interests of all human beings are to be weighed equally. 
Therefore, a person who, as Olafson explains, takes or tries to take 
an egocentric point of view failing to weigh interests equally, “will 
not be able to persist in this course of conduct without feeling the 
strain of contradiction within the policies by which that conduct is 
governed.” Thus, all conduct involving interpersonal transactions is 
governed by a set of presuppositions that make any social interac-
tion possible, one of which is that of according equal weight to the 
interests of others. An egocentric line of conduct, however, denies 
this presupposition.
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The relevance of all this for ethical universalizability, as Olafson 
explains, is that if we consider this principle in the “true context of 
ethical reflection ... that of an ethical community in which human be-
ings stand to one another in determinate relationships that register 
the actual needs and circumstances and multiple forms of interdepen-
dency that in fact characterize our lives ... the requirement of univer-
salizability is not simply an isolated logical thesis but widens into an 
immensely intricate and powerful dialectic of actions and persons.” 
Thus, Olafson might agree with Nielsen that if we consider the prin-
ciple of universalizability on its own as a logical thesis, then there is 
no contradiction involved in assenting to it yet denying a principle of 
impartiality. After all, as Nielsen points out, neither the principle itself 
nor considerations of logic and rationality entail the crucial judgment 
that all human beings are relevantly similar. However, analysis of “the 
pragmatic context” reveals that in general no one person’s interests 
occupy a position of privilege vis-à-vis the interests of others, i.e., in 
general all human beings are relevantly similar when it comes to the 
satisfaction of their interests. This condition is a requirement that we 
are bound to accept on pain of contradiction, and, together with con-
siderations of universalizability, it entails a principle of impartiality: 
In general, the interests of all other human beings are to be weighed 
equally. Thus, it is Olafson’s contention that when interpreted in the 
proper context, and not simply as a logical thesis, the principle of uni-
versalizability does entail substantive conclusions.
In some of his recent writings, including Moral Thinking: Its Levels, 
Point and Method, R. M. Hare has attempted to accomplish what Niels-
en argues cannot be done, viz., go from considerations of universaliz-
ability (together with non-moral principles of rationality) to a substan-
tive moral principle. Hare’s view is that “the requirement to univer-
salize’ our prescriptions generates utilitarianism” (Hare, 1981, p. 11). 
In ‘Reason, Impartiality and Utilitarianism,’ Michael Gorr investigates 
the connection in Hare’s work between ‘universal prescriptivism’ (the 
name generally given to Hare’s metaethical views) and utilitarianism.
Hare’s argument for a kind of preference utilitarianism based on two 
formal properties of singular moral judgments—universalizability and 
prescriptivity—is roughly the following. The formal or logical proper-
ties of universalizability and prescriptivity impose certain formal rules 
for reasoning from the moral point of view. In particular, such features 
require what Gorr calls the “full reversibility test.” That is, in judging 
from the point of view of morality one is to determine whether one 
can prescribe acting in accordance with a universal principle which, 
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as Gorr explains, involves determining “whether one would actually 
choose to perform that action if one knew that one would have to play, 
in a series of possible worlds otherwise identical to the actual world, 
the role of each person (including oneself) who would be affected.” 
Furthermore, one is not “simply to imagine oneself with one’s own 
interests, in the place of other persons,” but, rather, to imagine “hav-
ing in turn their interests and desires.” This thoroughgoing impartial-
ity requirement taken together with a Bayesian account of rationality 
entails the claim that a rational and fully informed universal prescriber 
would inevitably adopt and act on utilitarian principles. So, on Gorr’s 
reconstruction, Hare’s argument is this.
1. A rational person will always seek to maximize his expected 
 utility. (Bayesian principle)
2. Utility = preference satisfaction.
3. Adopting the moral point of view is equivalent to deciding 
 how to act as if one had (or were going to have) all the prefer-
 ences of all those who would be affected by one’s action. (Full 
 Reversibility Test)
4. Therefore, a rational person who adopts the moral point of 
 view will always seek to maximize the total expected utility 
 of the group of all persons who would be affected by his action.
This move from universal prescriptivism to utilitarianism via the full 
reversibility test is, of course, hard to reconcile with Hare’s well-known 
claim in Freedom and Reason that the thesis of universal prescriptivism is 
“normatively neutral” in the sense that it does not entail any moral the-
ory or principle. However, as Gorr points out, there are traces of Hare’s 
more recent views on the matter in Freedom and Reason, and, in the first 
part of his paper, Gorr suggests an explanation of why, in that earlier 
book, Hare held apparently inconsistent views on the question of the 
normative neutrality of universal prescriptivism. His suggestion is that 
there are two interpretations of the full reversibility test to be found in 
Hare’s earlier writings (the “in propria persona” and “ideal observer” 
interpretations) which Hare did not clearly distinguish and which led 
him to opposing views on the normative significance of his metaethical 
views. What Gorr points out is that, in Moral Thinking, Hare has made 
clear that he now accepts the second interpretation of the full reversibil-
ity test and that this in effect ensures that principles chosen by rational 
and informed universal prescribers will be utility maximizing.
In the remaining sections of his paper, Gorr considers the plausibil-
ity of Hare’s view that such a strong impartialism is constitutive of 
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morality (premise 3 of the above argument) and argues for the fol-
lowing claims: (1) The contention that a person might be motivated 
by a desire to be fully impartial is incapable of a non-circular explica-
tion; (2) Hare’s claim that a strong impartiality condition is a formal 
requirement of morality is counterintuitive; and (3) Hare’s metaethical 
theory does not entail such a strong impartiality requirement. If Gorr’s 
objections go through, serious doubt has been cast on Hare’s attempt 
to go from metaethical considerations concerning the logic of moral 
judgments (particularly the principle of universalizability) together 
with constraints on rationality to a substantive moral principle.
We have claimed that the principle under consideration is non-
substantive in the sense that it does not alone (or even together with 
non-moral judgments) entail any substantive moral judgments. But to 
say this is not to say or even imply that this principle is useless or 
pointless or inapplicable in the context of practical moral issues.4 Its 
use in such a context is illustrated by William Lycan in ‘Abortion and 
the Civil Rights of Machines.’ In fact it is one of Lycan’s main conten-
tions that an argument based on universalizability considerations is 
perhaps the best we may be able to do in making headway on the 
abortion issue. Lycan begins by claiming that because the fetus is a be-
ing of a “uniquely exceptional sort,” we have no clear intuitions about 
the putative rights of such beings. Moreover, no further analysis of 
personhood or further fact finding is going to help us move closer to 
clarifying our intuitions on this matter. Thus, Lycan proposes that we 
explore this issue via a rather indirect route that involves reflecting on 
the status and rights of certain sorts of hypothetical machines. Lycan’s 
proposed exploration proceeds roughly as follows.
Assuming that a materialist account of human beings is correct (that 
human beings have only physical attributes among their irreducible 
attributes) and in addition that it is technologically possible to (some-
day) construct a machine—a robot—that not only looks but behaves 
like an ordinary human being, Lycan claims that we could justifiably 
infer that such beings were conscious. Of course, given that conscious-
ness of a certain complexity (involving certain cognitive and conative 
capacities) is sufficient for personhood, Lycan concludes that such 
sophisticated machines would be clear cases of persons. Lycan then 
goes on to consider the case of certain hypothetical machines—“proto-
machines”—which do not yet possess those conceptual and conative 
capacities that are morally significant, but which are of a “highly in-
dividual basic design (which determines the personality it will have 
when it is finished).” We are to consider further the hypothetical case of 
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the proto-machine plugged into a “fully developed” mother machine 
and “ask whether it would be wrong for the technician to interrupt 
the mother-robot’s activity at an early stage (with its concurrence if it 
is a person), unplug the proto-machine from the mother, take it off the 
workbench and dismantle it.” Lycan reports no feelings of disapproval 
at the technician’s actions and argues that since the proto-machine and 
the fetus appear to be relevantly similar, then by the principle of uni-
versalizability, we may conclude that at least early on in fetal develop-
ment there is nothing morally wrong with aborting the fetus.5
KANTIAN UNIVERSALIZABILITY
The “universal law” formulation of Immanuel Kant’s categorical im-
perative has already been cited in two different versions as Principles 
3 and 4 near the beginning of this introduction. It was noted there that 
Kant made just about the most ambitious possible claim for this version 
of a universalizability principle, viz., that it is “the supreme principle 
of morality.” Kant’s view has been enormously controversial since it 
was first proposed, and issues of its interpretation and of its correct-
ness have each generated an immense literature. The provocativeness 
of Kant’s claim is added to by the fact that he believes that the prin-
ciple is in no way a consequentialist one; he condemns all teleological, 
and hence all consequentialist views as “heteronomous” theories of 
morality. The papers in the present volume that center upon explicit 
discussions of Kantian universalizability are three. Onora O’Neill de-
fends Kant’s claims. George Nakhnikian finds them (and just about 
any other substantive universalizability principle) lacking. And Jona-
than Harrison attempts a rapprochement between the historically hos-
tile Kantian and utilitarian views; his paper could have been placed 
with equal appropriateness in either the section on Kantian or the one 
on consequentialist generalization.
The essay entitled ‘Consistency in Action’ by Onora O’Neill is a de-
fense of the Kantian first formulation of the categorical imperative. She 
begins her essay (as does Nakhnikian) with an extended discussion of 
the Kantian concept of ‘“maxim.” This is surely a key move for any 
would-be defender of Kant, for in the Kantian concept of the maxim as 
the formulation of the inner principle of action is where we find hope, 
if anywhere, of replying to objections that actions can be described in 
an indefinitely large variety of ways for the purpose of universalizing 
them. Any given individual action can be made to turn out to possess 
the quite different and incompatible moral qualities depending on the 
description one arbitrarily chooses to universalize. The idea is that the 
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maxim state a fundamental description under which the agent per-
forms the action and this, at least when it can be formulated clearly and 
uniquely, provides the correct description of the action for the purposes 
of moral evaluation. O’Neill also makes the point that for Kant the pri-
mary moral quality of any action is an inner one of moral worth rather 
than an outward one of conformity with the requirements of external 
action. O’Neill, like Nakhnikian, emphasizes that there is a variety of 
ways in which maxims can be impossible or self-defeating prior to any 
consideration of their potential universalizability; but such difficulties 
must be cleared aside before a properly moral evaluation of the maxim 
can even begin. O’Neill states the intuitive idea behind the categorical 
imperative as being that” ... if we are to act as morally worthy beings we 
should not single ourselves out for special consideration or treatment” 
(p. 172). Actions which the universality test shows wrong are shown to 
result when we attempt to universalize acts or practices such as decep-
tion, coercion, and abrogation of autonomy. She states that much of 
the anti-Kantian literature here assumes that it is possible to state the 
proposed maxim of action in such a way that the action is described in 
quite a narrow fashion; but her earlier discussion of the nature of max-
ims has undercut this objection. The kinds of inconsistencies involved 
in Kant’s “contradiction in the will” examples are also discussed. A 
point that is emphasized throughout O’Neill’s essay is that Kant is not 
some sort of generalized utilitarian; the latter sort of view would be, 
according to Kant’s terminology, a heteronomous moral theory. “The 
interest of an autonomous universality test is that it aims to ground 
an ethical theory on notions of consistency and rationality rather than 
upon consideration of desire and preference” (p. 182).
In a lengthy and thorough essay, George Nakhnikian considers very 
seriously the claim of the first formulation of the categorical impera-
tive (“K1”) to be what Kant calls it, “the supreme principle of moral-
ity,” and finally rejects the claim. He looks with more favor upon the 
second formulation, which draws moral consequences from the fact 
that human beings are to be regarded as absolute ends who are not 
to be treated as mere means, and the third, “kingdom-of-ends” for-
mulation which mentions as essential the peer status of moral agent-
legislator-subjects. But our main interest in the present discussion is in 
Nakhnikian’s thesis that “K1 does not work” (p.189).
As we consider this claim more closely we find that what Nakhni-
kian has to say has an interest quite far beyond issues of the exegesis 
of Kant. From its Kantian beginnings, his discussion becomes a much 
broader and more general discussion of the possible modes of univer-
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salizability, in a sense attempting to cover the range of possible uni-
versalizability theses in the same thorough way that Narveson does, 
though as it turns out the possibilities that he discusses are mostly 
rather different from those discussed by Narveson. Thus for example, 
he discusses logically and physically impossible practical situations, 
and physically possible practical situations that cannot be universally 
practiced, and those that can be, but that in various ways we could not 
will to be universal practice.
The difficulties that Naknikian finds in Kantian and related versions 
of universalizability revolve around a set of counterexamples first 
stated on pp. 202-203, those of patenting an invention, visiting a sick 
friend in the hospital, publishing Icelandic jokes in a journal, and lying 
only in cases where no-one will find out.
Many discussions of universalizability criteria of morality have been 
carried on in terms of alleged counterexamples. Marcus Singer’s Gen-
eralization in Ethics (1961) mentions a wealth of such proposed coun-
terexamples and attempts to respond to them, and a fair amount of the 
literature discussing Kant on the application of the categorical impera-
tive does the same. There is a large literature discussing Kant’s famous 
four examples in the Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (1785), the 
arguments for the wrongness of suicide, making a lying promise, 
and the obligation to develop one’s talents and to render aid to an-
other. These are not “counterexamples” to universalizability, at least 
certainly not so far as Kant’s intentions were concerned! But Kant’s 
application arguments have seemed to a number of writers either so 
inadequate or so obscure that for these people they have come to be re-
garded as counterexamples to Kant’s claim to be able to apply the first 
formulation (the “universalizability” formulation) to moral situations 
to obtain unique correct answers to the question “Is an action of sort S 
morally correct or not?”
Nakhnikian sees his proposed counterexamples as not just show-
ing the first formulation of the categorical imperative to be seriously 
defective. His conclusion is more general: it is that any such universal-
izability criterion must exhibit the same defects, must fall to the same 
counterexamples. Such scepticism about purely “formal” criteria of 
morality dates back at least to Hegel, who has some of his own pro-
posed counterexamples.
On the other hand there also seems to be a perennial attractiveness 
about some concepts of universalizability, for they have their defend-
ers today, as can be seen by examining the contributions to the present 
anthology by Narveson, O’Neill, and Singer, among others.
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The counterexamples that Nakhnikian proposes call for further de-
tailed discussion, something that is beyond the scope of this introduc-
tion. One large class of counterexamples to Kantian universalizability 
deal with the alleged arbitrariness of the deSCription of actions for 
the purpose of moral evaluation. Singer’s discussion of the concepts 
of “invertibility” and “reiter ability” in Generalization in Ethics (1961) 
is one important attempt to deal with this problem. Potter (1973) also 
discusses this issue in its Kantian context. There are no doubt also oth-
er classes of counterexamples that result from other kinds of problems 
with universalizability, such as questions about the relevance or ir-
relevance of the wants, wishes, or likely actions of others. (Is it right 
to perform an action that is such that if many performed it, we could 
not accept the consequences, just in case very few others are likely 
to want to perform such an action? Is it obligatory to render aid to 
another when others are failing to do their part in rendering aid, and 
this makes it either likely or certain that my own attempt to render aid 
will be unsuc cessful?) Another kind of issue arises when we are con-
sidering cases of actions based on false beliefs, a kind of case that Kant 
never mentions, and still different cases arise from puzzles concerning 
competition, in which, necessarily, not everyone can win (O’Neill dis-
cusses these in her paper).
CONSEQUENTIALIST UNIVERSALIZABILITY
As has already been remarked, the paper by Jonathan Harrison, 
though placed by us in the division on consequentialism could equal-
ly well have been placed in the section on Kantian universalizability. 
Harrison’s main aim is to show that there are large areas of agree-
ment between Kantians and utilitarians, and in particular that many of 
Kant’s criticisms of teleological ethics do not apply as sound criticisms 
to utilitarianism.
The version of utilitarianism that Harrison defends is a version he calls 
“cumulative effect utilitarianism,” to distinguish it from rule utilitarian-
ism, and a kind of “ideal” utilitarianism which is prepared to allow that 
Kantian moral virtue might be something good in itself, an admission 
that would of course be incompatible with the hedonism of classical 
utilitarianism. Here are some of the Kantian objections that in Harrison’s 
view do not have proper application to utilitarianism: (1) Kant thought 
that teleological theories all appeal to the agent’s own inclination, but 
utilitarianism, which demands that we seek for the good of all, does not. 
We are not likely to have an inclination to bring about the good of all, 
and it is also clear that our having the utilitarian obligation does not pre-
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suppose our having the inclination. (2) It is quite possible and reasonable 
to develop a version of utilitarianism which does not have the rightness 
or wrongness of acts depend on actual consequences, but instead has 
such moral qualities of acts depend on intended consequences and the 
qualities of character which tend to produce certain kinds of facts. Such 
a version of utilitarianism is closer to Kant’s view. (3) Kant thought that 
duty, as a modal notion, implied a kind of necessity, and he thought that 
teleological ethics was incompatible with morality properly conceived. 
Harrison in response tries to sort out the kinds of necessity which moral 
judgments do and do not have, mentioning some of the possible con-
fusions that may arise concerning such issues. He concludes that Kant 
may have been guilty of certain confusions, and that in any case Harri-
son’s version of utilitarianism is not incompatible with the proper kinds 
of necessity attaching to moral judgments.
Meanwhile, Harrison does have some criticisms of Kant: (1) He thinks 
that Kant exaggerated the goodness of good will. Even if it is allowed as 
a good in itself, it is not the only good in itself, nor is its good infinitely 
greater than other kinds of goodness. (2) On the matter of greatest inter-
est in this anthology Harrison says that Kant’s universal law formulation 
of the categorical imperative marks “the point at which utilitarianism 
has to be modified in order to fulfill Kant’s requirements.” The modi-
fication arises in cases such as promise-keeping, where the utilitarian 
would recommend failing to keep promises in certain individual cases; 
if such recommendations were commonly followed by bad consequenc-
es—the cumulative consequences of a large number of promise-break-
ings—would follow. So the individual is well advised not to follow the 
utilitarian’s advice, not because his maxim would be self defeating if 
universalized (this fact has no relevance to the moral quality of the act 
in Harrison’s view), but because there would be bad consequences. Har-
rison recognizes that this point does not quite mean that he is accepting 
Kants first formulation, but he thinks it comes rather close.
The papers by Cork and Gillespie concern Marcus Singer’s general-
ization argument:
If everyone were to do that, the consequences would be undesirable, 
therefore no one ought to do that.
The principle corresponding to this argument,
If the consequences of everyone’s doing that would be undesirable, 
then no one ought to do that
functions in Singer’s theory as the supreme moral principle and thus 
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“serves as a test or criterion of the morality of conduct, and provides 
the basis for moral rules” (Singer, 1961, p. 9).
Now Singer offers an argument or deduction of this principle (GA, 
hereafter) of the following sort.
(1) If the consequences of A’s doing x would be undesirable, then 
 A ought not to do x. (The principle of consequences, C.)
(2) If the consequences of everyone’s doing x would be undesir
 able, then not everyone ought to do x. (The generalization 
 from the principle of consequences, GC.)
(3) If not everyone ought to do x, then no one ought to do x. (The 
 generalization principle, GP.)
(4) Therefore, if the consequences of everyone’s doing x would 
 be undesirable, then no one ought to do x. (GA.)
Premise (2) is said to be a generalization from (1) –the latter taken to be 
necessary—and (4) is supposed to follow from (2) and (3).
This argument has been the subject of a good deal of criticism, per-
haps the most common being the so-called ‘collective-distributive’ crit-
icism which can be explained as follows. The term ‘everyone’ can be 
construed collectively as referring to the whole of a class of (relevantly 
similar) agents or distributively as referring to each and every particular 
member of that class. Accordingly, GC admits of two interpretations 
depending on how ‘everyone’ is understood in the consequent.
If the consequences of everyone’s doing x would be undesirable, then 
it ought to be that someone not do x. (The collective interpretation.)
If the consequences of everyone’s doing x would be undesirable, then 
there is someone who ought not to do x. (The distributive interpretation.)
The problem is this. On the collective interpretation, the argument is 
invalid since as Singer makes clear ‘everyone’ in the antecedent of GP 
(Premise 4) is to be read distributively. However, on the distributive 
interpretation, GC is susceptible to counterexamples of the following 
sort. Although if no one stands guard duty on a particular occasion, 
the consequences would be undesirable, it does not follow that there js 
someone about whom we could say that he ought to stand guard duty 
and could be punished for not doing so (Nakhnikian, 1964, p. 446)
Charles M. Cork, in his ‘The Deontic Structure of the Generalization 
Argument’, develops a formalized version of Singer’s argument that 
attempts to avoid this collective-distributive problem. His new version 
involves an analysis of the consequent of GC (‘it ought to be the case that 
someone not do x’) that allows a transition to a distributive claim about 
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the members of the relevant set of agents but “not to those flesh and 
blood relevantly similar agents ... to whom we can point, but to logical 
constructions of agents (blanks, as it were), into which the former can 
be filled ....” In other words, instead of distributing the collective obliga-
tion to avoid undesirable consequences to identifiable persons (which 
then raises the embarrassing question of who is forbidden to perform 
the action in question), on Cork’s analysis, such obligation is distributed 
to “arbitrary members of a set, .. defined here as those about whom we 
make no assumptions other than their membership in the set.”
If successful, Cork’s analysis of this argument not only solves the 
collective-distributive problem but helps make clear how the various 
alleged counterexamples to the generalization argument can be han-
dled by Singer’s theory.
Antecedent to the publication of David Lyons’ Forms and Limits of 
Utilitarianism, it was generally thought that so-called general utilitari-
anism (a label used to characterize Singer’s generalization argument) 
was immune to certain apparently devastating criticisms besetting 
analogous forms of simple or act utilitarianism. The claim was that a 
principle like Singer’s is able to account for our obligations concerning 
generally accepted moral rules that are troublesome on the act utilitar-
ian view. This alleged difference between analogous forms of these 
two sorts of theory was challenged by Lyons who argued persua-
sively that despite appearances, analogous forms of simple and gen-
eral utilitarianism are really extensionally equivalent—they yield the 
same substantive judgments when applied to the same cases. In other 
words, according to Lyons once we bring into consideration all of the 
relevant facts and utilities bearing on a particular case, “it matters not 
whether we ask ‘What would happen if everyone did the same?’ in-
stead of ‘What would happen if this act were performed?,’” (Lyons, 
1965, p. 119), the results of these two tests will be the same.
Our final article, Norman Gillespie’s ‘Moral Reasons and the Gen-
eralization Test in Ethics’, concerns Lyons’ extensional equivalence 
thesis. In particular, Gillespie considers Lyons’ explanation of the rel-
evance of the behavior of others in describing actions for purposes of 
applying the generalization test which is the key to the reductive the-
sis. Gillespie distinguishes two readings of the generalization test—the 
de dicto and the de re—and argues that it is Lyons’ de dicto reading of the 
test that leads him to mistaken conclusions about the relevance of the 
behavior of others in applying the test. According to Gillespie, once 
the test is interpreted de re, which “is the appropriate one for capturing 
its moral force,” we can see not only that the extensional equivalence 
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thesis fails but that the test is not strictly utilitarian. In fact, as Gillespie 
explains, “The moral point of the generalization test in ethics is not that 
your act will, either incidentally or as part of a general practice, pro-
duce undesirable consequences, but that it is unfair.”
CONCLUSION
The aim of the present volume is to show that recent philosophical 
thought on universalizability is multifaceted and alive, and is making ad-
vances. This has been done by presenting a wide variety of work by au-
thors who are among the best of those currently working on these issues. 
This introduction has aimed to present the main points of our authors in 
summary form, exhibiting some of their relationships to each other.
Now that we have briefly discussed the papers included here it can 
be seen that they each have an important role to play in further discus-
sions of this general topic. The pieces by Singer, Gillespie, and Cork 
discuss and reassess one of the major works on this aspect of moral 
philosophy, Singer’s own Generalization in Ethics. O’Neill, Nakhnikian, 
and Harrison take views each opposed to the other on the interpreta-
tion of Immanuel Kant’s view on universalizability. Kant is surely the 
single most important historical writer on this topic in ethics. Michael 
Gorr takes up a recent important new work by another major contem-
porary figure in the literature of universalizability, the man who cre-
ated the term, R. M. Hare. Nielsen considers (and rejects) connections 
with the seemingly related concept of impartiality. Lycan considers a 
problem arising in the application of certain universalizability prin-
ciples, viz., that some kinds of moral issues seem to be unique, and 
thus, frustratingly, to allow of no clearcut moral analogies with other 
issues that could be used to alleviate our moral perplexity. Rabinowicz 
discusses a closely related issue that is also discussed in various ways 
by O’Neill and others, the problem of how to interpret the universaliz-
ability principle so as to avoid the Scylla of the banal useless truism, 
and the Charybdis of an unuseable notion of “ethical relevance.” The 
issue is that of the relativity of descriptions of action that are to be 
evaluated morally, the multiplicity of available descriptions, and the 
seeming arbitrariness of choosing one description over another.
The essay by Frederick Olafson, which chooses as its text an interest-
ing and neglected passage from an important classic of moral philoso-
phy, J. S. Mill’s Utilitarianism, illustrates the ways in which utilitarian 
and deontological themes often intermingle in discussions of universal-
izability. The same point is illustrated in different ways in the work here 
by Harrison, Gillespie, and Narveson. “Unfairness” considerations are 
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surely best understood as non consequentialist if not Kantian in their ap-
peal. The fact that (if Gillespie is correct) Singer’s theory, which has been 
taken by most readers to be consequentialist, contains, when properly 
understood, an important appeal to the deontological characteristic of 
“unfairness” illustrates the complex interplay of consequentialist and 
Kantian moral characteristics which we have also seen in other papers.
In fact it is often difficult to discern when a conception of universal-
izability is purely consequentialist as opposed to when it contains ap-
peals only to deontological elements. Likewise it is sometimes difficult 
to discern whether a universalizability principle is merely “logical” 
and hence non substantive, or whether it may in fact have some impor-
tant element of extra-logical substance.
The distinctions on which we based the organization of this volume 
of essays, though important ones, are often overlooked or overridden 
by actual philosophical practice. This present introduction is not in-
tended as a brief for philosophical purity with respect to such distinc-
tions. The common presence of “impurity” surely reflects something 
important about the moral phenomena that are under discussion.
There is no common theme or new consensus that emerges from this 
collection. Any attempt to achieve consensus or to unify under a com-
mon theme is surely premature. In no case, we think, does an essay 
in this collection resolve and thereby close off further philosophical 
discussion. The usefulness of the essays is much more likely to lie in a 
different direction—in the direction of providing advances upon pre-
vious current discussion and thereby not closing off but rather open-
ing up these issues and providing a stimulus to further discussion.
NOTES
1 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (Ostwald translation (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 
1962, p. 118), Book V, Chapter 3, 1131a13-23).
2 An even more radical thesis would be that of giving the treatment that will yield 
equal results (compensating equality). For a discussion of this sort of equality see 
Onora O’Neill s essay, ‘Opportunities, Equalities, and Education’ (Theory and Deci-
sion, 7 275-295, October 1976).
3 Without involving ourselves in the task of defining what counts as a consequen-
tialist moral theory or principle, suffice it to say that we are using the term in a 
general way intended to cover utilitarians of all varieties as well as, e.g., Singer’s 
theory which, as he correctly insists, is not, strictly speaking, utilitarian (see Sing-
er, 1977).
4 On this point see Sid B. Thomas (1968).
5 As Lycan admits, the analogy here needs some adjusting which he attempts to 
supply and, moreover, this particular argument is only persuasive (if at all) when 
considering the proto-machine at an early stage of construction development.
